by Ken Hamrick
In a recent discussion with Dr. Lane Tipton and others on the Reformed Forum Discord, I was offered Robert Strimple’s critique of Realism as “the finest… ever heard.” What follows is my informal engagement of that critique, as posted in that discussion.
You can find much of the remainder of that discussion here.
Dr. Robert B. Strimple, Professor of Systematic Theology at Westminster Seminary California, approaches the origin of the soul in the following lecture: https://www.wscal.edu/resource-center/trichotomy-the-origin-of-the-soul-the-covenant-of-works-part-1 beginning at 07:55; He teaches about Realism in two of his lectures: https://www.wscal.edu/resource-center/the-parties-involved-part-2 beginning at 40:20, and continuing with: https://www.wscal.edu/resource-center/the-parties-involved-part-3
Realism is the biblical principle of a shared identity grounded in a spiritual union or singularity of spiritual origin–and more broadly, Realism is a paradigm in which God’s justice depends on substantial reality; whereas Nominalism is the denial of any identifying union of immaterial substance within the man, Adam–and more broadly, it is a paradigm in which substantial reality is not necessary to God’s justice. Realists, from their paradigm, seek a justice that is commensurate with the facts of substantial reality (you cannot be guilty unless you committed the crime) and find it in a real union of immaterial substance inside Adam; whereas Nominalists see no necessity for justice to be dependent on the facts of substantial reality, but instead, include the nonsubstantial thoughts of God as sufficient ground for justice (you’re guilty if God reckons you as guilty, even without committing the crime), and so they are content to locate man’s union with Adam as inside God’s mind alone.
Dr. Strimple sides with traducianism, as it “has done most justice to the unity of man and the unity of the race;” but he rejects Realism, saying it is not necessary “to leap to Realist conclusions from traducianism.” He agrees with the traducianism of Gordon Clark. This brings up an important distinction as to exactly what is Realism. There are some who hold to traducianism but not to Realism; but such is uncommon. Clark has a chapter on traducianism, in his book, The Atonement, pp, 109-122. Traducianism for Clark serves only to explain inherited depravity. He is thoroughly nominalistic in his understanding of imputation. While he does see the soul as the seat of sin, and traducianism as the best explanation of depravity, he fails to see that what is traduced is the seat of moral agency. To him, our traduced souls make us depraved and the sovereign choice of God to impute makes us guilty. Like typical nominalists, he thinks that only persons (not natures) can be guilty. Clark would not see traducianism needing or indicating a corporate mode (or, “race-mode”) of immaterial existence. Nominalistically defined, only individuals exist, and corporate existence is expressly denied. Any who define traducianism according to nominalistic presuppositions think it accurate to describe it as “biological or physical unity.” Clark’s version treats the soul not as an agent but as more of an inherited moral organ. Realism sees the soul as entailing more than a moral condition or state: unless the soul we inherit by traducianism brings with it not only the moral condition from whence it came but also the history of moral agency in Adam, then it is not a soul that we inherit. Realism is the propagation and inheritance of a moral agency that brings with it a history of having chosen sin in Adam. Mere physical union does not explain it. Mere inherited depravity does not explain it.
Following John Murray in his book, The Imputation of Adam’s Sin, Dr. Strimple offers,
“…And so there is what we can speak of as a biological union between Adam and the rest of the race–seminal, genealogical, whichever term you like to use here–a genealogical union, a seminal, a biological union–and some have said that that kind of union was all that was necessary for Adam’s offspring to be bound up with him in his act of sin and the resulting condemnation and death. An appeal has been made here to Hebrews, chapter 7, verses 9 & 10.”
He and Murray both hold out this Hebrews text as being used for support by those who argue for a mere biological union. But who are those who think that a biological descent is enough? The only ones using this text to support a union of Adam and his posterity are those who hold to a realistic union. Murray and Strimple seem to be dismissing out of hand the Realist position on this text by presenting it as if it was the common argument of some group in history who held that biological union was sufficient, and then giving a nod to the supposed weight of the argument before showing why it is not sufficient. But where is the engagement of the Realist argument regarding this text? Both Strimple and Murray quote from William G. T. Shedd in other specifics, but how is it that neither of them has read this from Shedd (Dogmatic Theology, 3rd ed., pp. 441-442)?
“…Levi and his descendants are said to have had an existence that was real, not fictitious, in Abraham. But it contradicts the context to confine this statement to the physical and irrational side of Levi and his descendants. The ‘paying of tithes’ which led to the statement is a rational and moral act and implies a rational and moral nature as the basis of it.”
This was a realistic union, and not merely physical.
Realism holds that human propagation is of the whole being, both spirit (or “soul”) and body, so that to be genealogically descended from Adam is far more than to be merely biologically descended. However, unlike so-called “traducianists who deny Realism,” Realists see moral agency of the soul as continuous with the substance, so that there is nothing of the soul that may be propagated apart from the moral agency that is the soul; therefore, propagation out of the substance of Adam entails that the progeny had a participation in Adam’s being and his sin while in a corporate mode of spiritual existence. While in Adam, we all sinned with him and spiritually died. There cannot be a continuity of the substance of the soul without a continuity of being and moral agency. Dr. Strimple goes on to say,
“So the argument says that… couldn’t we in the same way properly say that all mankind was in the loins of Adam–was in the body of Adam–when Adam sinned… and thus, they sinned with him and fell with him in his first transgression? Early Reformed theology emphasized this. For example…: Westminster Confession of Faith, chapter 6, section 3. Notice that first phrase: ‘They being the root of all mankind…’ The only thing that’s mentioned there in the Westminster Confession is this matter of genealogical/biological union. They being the seminal root of all mankind…the result has been the imputation and depravity conveyed.”
By “genealogical/biological union,” he means simply biological. This begs the question, again ignoring the Realist argument as if it did not exist. The fact is that all the Reformed creeds and confessions were realistic in their language. While the term, ‘representative,’ was available to them, they avoided it (as Shedd argues).
A “public person” can be inclusive of the idea of representation, but it is also inclusive of the idea of realistic headship. And terms such as, “seminal union,” “root of mankind,” and “conveyed to all their posterity by natural propagation,” etc., originated in the Realist view and had realistic meaning, which long preceded the nominalistic federal view. Adam as “the root of mankind” explained the “natural union” resulting from “natural propagation” of the whole nature–also called “natural headship” as opposed to “federal headship.” But the Representationists developed collective amnesia over the last few centuries and now act as if no realistic meaning was ever intended. Dr. Strimple continues by claiming that biological union cannot explain why imputation should be restricted to only Adam’s first sin. This is a mistake, as this objection was the historical argument against the Realistic view, not an argument against any strictly “biological” view. If mankind in a real way participated in Adam’s sin due to a realistic union of spiritual nature, then why were not his subsequent sins also imputed to mankind (as well as the sins of all progenitors to their progeny)? While it is true that this was the question that eventually caused Realism to fall out of favor, it is also true that the question itself is not well thought out. Such an objection fails to rightly assess the catastrophic nature of the fall. Everything changed with that first sin–neither man nor the world was the same after that; so how could anyone compare subsequent sins to that first? If Adam’s second sin had been imputed, would we be doubly depraved or doubly condemned or doubly mortal? But turning around the parallel, how could anyone contend that only Christ’s final righteous act–and none of His previous acts of human righteousness–is imputed to us?
Just as His final act of righteousness encompassed His whole life of righteousness, Adam’s first sin encompassed his whole life of sin afterwards. And just as Christ’s life-characterizing obedience reconciles us to God, Adam’s life-characterizing disobedience made us sinners. Biblically speaking, the importance of that first sin is entirely because it was the first, and sins after that were irrelevant by comparison, as no subsequent sin could ever be the first again. The Bible was not trying to explain to us how we each received one of Adam’s sins on our record; rather, it was explaining the utter disaster and corruption caused by Adam and brought upon us. The prospect of Adam’s subsequent sins being imputed to us might fit with the restricted view of man-made confessions, but the tenor of the question is completely outside the purpose and meaning of Scripture. Once men are fallen, they cannot again fall. Dr. Strimple objects to the highly philosophical nature of the Realistic view as expressed by Shedd. But Realism need not be as complex and philosophical as Shedd makes it out to be. His statement, that human nature is “an elementary, invisible substance… without extension…” is better understood as the human spirit. Men have two sides to human nature: the physical and the spiritual (or the material and the immaterial). We have no problem understanding that our physical nature has substance and is not necessarily just a set of common characteristics or attributes. Both ways of describing our physical nature are easily understood. And it is just as easily understood that our physical nature had its physical origin in Adam’s physical nature–that there has been a continuity of substance and nature–as far as the physical side of our humanity goes–from Adam down through the generations to us. So then, would it be difficult to see that while our physical nature is visible, our spiritual nature is invisible?
No one, I think, doubts that every man has an invisible spirit within him that departs upon his death. The only difficulty might be in comprehending that even the immaterial, invisible spirit within us can be properly thought of and characterized as a substance. So just as my body can be thought of as my physical nature, my spirit can be thought of as my spiritual nature–and not merely as a set of characteristics common to the human spirit in everyone. Considering all this, is it still difficult to consider that this spiritual nature within us (in the form of the spirit within us) is a substance and nature that has been passed down from the spiritual nature of Adam to us?
Dr. Strimple states:
“I think we have to ask, first of all, does the Realist notion really relieve this difficulty of the apparent injustice of our being held accountable for the sin of Adam? And I think the answer is clearly, no, it doesn’t solve that problem, because the difficulty is this: how can an individual of the race bear the guilt of a sin in which he did not personally, voluntarily as an individual participate? And the Realist has to admit he did not personally, voluntarily, individually participate in the sin of Adam. Philip Huges says, ‘All human nature was vitiated by that first sin because the whole of humanity was present and took part in the commission of that first sin.’ They weren’t taking part personally, individually, by choice.”
Dr. Strimple then quotes Murray as saying, “The sin of generic humanity ([RS:] some abstract, invisible human nature) is just as far removed from the individual sin of the members of posterity as is the sin of a representative head…” Look carefully here and you will see that underlying this objection is a leveraging of and appeal to the modern individualistic mindset, which is itself not unrelated to the prevailing influence of Nominalism in theology.
Of course, having forgotten Realism, men now assume that guilt must be individual; so there is a subtle begging of the question here. It is only on the assumption that guilt must be individual and cannot be corporate that the objection holds true–that the sin of a generic human nature is just as far removed from the members of posterity as the sin of a representative head. It is no less than the denial that a continuity of nature as a substance would be a continuity of being and agency. A propagated continuity of being and agency would mean that individual spiritual existence is preceded by a corporate mode of spiritual existence, in which the future propagated individuals share in both the moral decision and the guilt of the prior corporate mode of existence. Only by assuming that this is not true can the objection by Murray and Strimple be valid–and so it amounts to only the begging of the question.
Strangely, Dr. Strimple suggests we find support for his view by asking the opinion of unbelievers:
“Try the Realist explanation out on your unbelieving friends and see if they are satisfied that it provides a just and fair basis for the imputation to them of Adam’s sin. I submit that any claim that the Realist view presents an explanation for the involvement of the whole race in the pollution, guilt and punishment of Adam’s sin will be unacceptable to the natural man. It will not be acceptable as reasonable and just, and to say that it will is a false claim…”
No proposed doctrinal view should be judged by how it will be received by unbelievers.
Dr. Strimple objects:
“The argument that the Realist view provides the only just basis for the involvement of the race in Adam’s sin fails to take into consideration the fact that the Bible teaches that there is a solidarity in responsibility and liability in other relationships where no such specific, generic unity exists. Here we’re thinking of the fact that the Bible lays stress on such corporate relationships as the family and the nation and upon corporate responsibilities within these relationships. Seems quite proper and reasonable to apply this same principle of corporate responsibility to the whole race in Adam. And since no realistic union exists in the family or in the nation, there’s no reason to insist that it must exist between Adam and his posterity.”
First, nowhere does Scripture indicate that anyone is condemned at the bar of God’s eternal judgment due to the kinds of solidarity and corporate responsibility that are entailed in members of a family or members of a nation. Temporal penalties may be suffered, but not eternal penalties.
Second, every person involved in such corporate relationships is a born sinner, having already corporately sinned while in the loins of Adam; and so no one has any right to claim injustice for anything that happens to them in this life short of the torment of hell that they deserve. Third, what is conspicuously absent from the provided examples of temporal, corporate relationships are the examples of realistic union being involved. Families are generationally realistic. For example, Elijah cursed the future descendants of Gehazi with leprosy because of his sinful act. Also, nations were named for their progenitor, from which they came into being–Israel, for example. O. Palmer Robertson, in his book, The Christ of the Covenants, p. 35, states:
“When God determined to relate to a people covenantally, he made his arrangement a genealogical one. This aspect of the covenant is present in the Abrahamic, the Mosaic, and the Davidic covenants. It is manifested specifically in the reference to the ‘seed’-concept (cf. Gen. 15:18; Exod. 20:5, 6; Deut. 7:9; II Sam. 7:12). David’s son is not simply heir of the covenant promises made to Moses and Abraham. The genealogical promises of God’s covenants assure his participation in the blessings of the Abrahamic and the Mosaic as well as the Davidic covenant.”
Robertson is about to make an argument for traducianism, although he does not intend to. In doing so, he points out from Scripture a text that strongly supports a grounding of the covenants in realistic participation of those not yet begotten. He continues, pp. 35-36:
“This principle of the unity of the covenants established by a genealogical relationship finds rather dramatic expression in certain passages of Scripture. Two points in the renewal of the Mosaic covanant as recorded in Deuteronomy particularly may be noted. One passage occurs early in this covenant-renewal document, and one passage occurs near the end of the document. Deuteronomy 5:2, 3 reads as follows: ‘The Lord our God made a covenant with us at Horeb. The Lord did not make this covenant with our fathers, but with us, with all those of us alive here today.’ The original text is particularly emphatic. It stresses the fact that it was the people standing in the plains of Moab at the end of the forty years in the desert who were involved in the covenant-making ceremony at Sinai (Horeb). This affirmation is particularly striking in the light of the earlier statement of Deuteronomy that all the generation of those present at Sinai finally had perished in the wilderness (Deut. 2:14, 15; cf. Num. 14:28-35; 26:63-65). Some of those assembled in the plains of Moab had been among the juveniles at Sinai and thus had been present personally when the covenant originally was made. But the great majority of those with whom the covenant was renewed in Moab were not even born when God appeared as covenant Lord at Sinai. Yet Moses affirms with startling emphasis that all of them indeed were “present” at Sinai. Because of solidarity with their forefathers by genealogical continuity they were involved in the covenant-making ceremony of Sinai.”
But here’s where Robertson, by failing to fully recognize that the principle here is one of Realism and not of Nominalism, slips up. He continues, p. 36:
“To dramatize Moses’ words at this point, the text of Deuteronomy 5:3 might be read: ‘. . . with us, the Christians of the twentieth century, all of us alive in Christ today, God made the covenant at Sinai.’ Every generation of subsequent believers was present at the time of the making of the ancient covenant by the genealogical principle. The covenant of God to redeem a people to himself is indeed a unified whole.”
This leap is unjustified. You and I and all of mankind were present in Adam, but no Christian who did not descend from Israel was present at Sinai for the making of the covenant at Sinai. Nonetheless, this passage is a strong example showing that realistic union was not completely absent from national solidarity.
Dr. Strimple continues:
“The analogy that the Scripture institutes between Adam and Christ (especially Romans 5 and 1 Cor. 15) presents–Murray thinks and I agree–a great difficulty to the Realist view. You see, the Realists admit that there is no realistic union between Christ and those justified in Him. Thus, on their approach, there would be a great difference between Adam–the kind of union that exists in relationship between Adam and men and women in him–very different from the kind of union between Christ and men and women in Him. But the parallelism–the analogy–instituted here in Romans 5… seems to point to an identity in the modus operandi–seems to point to an identity in the mode of operation–an identity seriously weakened if the kind of union involved in the one case was utterly different from the kind of union involved in the other.”
This misunderstanding of the Realistic view has been caused by some realistic theologians who leaned too heavily on philosophical language. It is not necessary to describe our union in Adam in terms of, “specific unity,” etc. By describing the union in terms that only apply to descent from our common parent, we miss the parallel to our union in Christ—and this is precisely the objection. We do not descend from Jesus. There was not in Him an entity of “unindividualized” human nature, “specifically and numerically one,” that is passed down to us. Therefore, it is objected, the necessary analogy of Rom. 5:12-19 disqualifies the Realistic view as inadequate.
Two things are wrong with this objection. First, the immaterial nature that is ours from Adam does indeed have something in common with the immaterial nature that we gain in Christ. George Hutchinson, in his book, The Problem of Original Sin in American Presbyterian Theology, perceptively asks, “Now we know that whereas the vital union with Adam is natural, the vital union with Christ is supernatural; but may we not ask whether there is perhaps a divinely intended analogy between these two relationships, and, if so, what is the precise nature of such an analogy?”
As a realistic opponent of Charles Hodge, Samuel J. Baird expounds this analogy:
“We have seen the zeal with which the position is maintained, that the doctrine of imputation “does not include the idea of a mysterious identity of Adam and his race. By parity of reason it should not include the idea of a mysterious identity between Christ and his people. And accordingly, in the system presented in the review [by Charles Hodge, of Baird’s book, The Elohim Revealed], the relation which in the Scriptures and our standards, the mystical union sustains to justification is ignored, and the doctrine represented as complete without it, and to the exclusion of it. ‘Christ in the covenant of redemption, is constituted the head and representative of his people; and, in virtue of this federal union, and agreeably to the terms of the eternal covenant, they are regarded and treated as having done what he did and suffered what he suffered in their name and in their behalf.’ According to our understanding of the Scriptures, it was provided in the eternal covenant that the elect should be actually ingrafted into Christ by his Spirit, and their acceptance and justification is by virtue of this their actual union to him. ‘[… The] union, which is constituted by virtue of the transmission of the nature, itself conveys a proprietary title in the moral and legal relations of the head; whilst the efficient principle which thus unites, is also fruitful in effects appropriate to the nature whence it flows. Thus, the sin of Adam, and the righteousness of Christ are severally imputed to their seed, by virtue of the union, constituted in the one case by the principle of natural generation, and in the other, by “the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,’”the Holy Spirit, the principle of regeneration […]’ [The Elohim Revealed, p. 317].”
Baird, continuing, refers to a real inbeing:
“[…]If the imputation of Christ’s righteousness be founded in a real inbeing in him, wrought by the uniting power of his Spirit in regeneration,—if it is thus that we are brought within the provisions of the covenant of grace to our justification, it follows, (we will venture the word,) incontestably, that the imputation to us of Adam’s sin, is founded in a real inbeing in him, by natural generation, by virtue of which we come under the provisions of the covenant of works, to our condemnation. But this, according to our reviewer [Hodge], is ‘simply a physiological theory,’ involving ‘a mysterious identity,’ which he cannot admit. Hence the necessity of ignoring the doctrine, in its relation to justification.”
It is this “real inbeing” that we have in both Adam and Christ that is the heart and soul of Biblical realism. Our old nature was propagated out of Adam, but our new nature is gained in Christ. Both involve a community of nature: one old and in Adam when he sinned, and one new and in us now. This brings us to the second thing wrong with the objection.
The parallel is not exact, but inverse, involving opposites. We were born out of Adam, but we are reborn into Christ. The sinful, spiritual nature of one man was propagated to the many; but the many are justified by being spiritually brought into One, Christ. The nature of one (Adam) became dispersed into the many separate individuals, the sin of one leading to the condemnation of the many; but, now the many are being collected into the One (Christ), and the sins of the many are justified through union with the One. Adam is not merely the physical progenitor, but also the spiritual progenitor of his race of people. Christ is the spiritual progenitor of His new race of people. The old race is propagated naturally because the immaterial nature is propagated along with the material nature. The new race is propagated supernaturally because the Holy Spirit unites the believer with the immaterial nature of Christ. The parallel holds.
The forgotten Realist 