The Phantom Reality of Representationism

by Ken Hamrick

This is an informal discussion of the concluding part of John Murray’s book, The Imputation of Adam’s Sin, (Phillipsburg, NJ: Wm. B. Eerdman, 1959). As a Realist, I disagree with Murray’s Representationist view (which is also a Nominalistic Federal view).

Realism is the biblical principle of a shared identity grounded in a spiritual union or singularity of spiritual origin–and more broadly, Realism is a paradigm in which God’s justice depends on substantial reality; whereas Nominalism is the denial of any identifying union of immaterial substance within the man, Adam–and more broadly, it is a paradigm in which substantial reality is not necessary to God’s justice. Realists, from their paradigm, seek a justice that is commensurate with the facts of substantial reality and find it in a real union of immaterial substance inside Adam; whereas Nominalists see no necessity for justice to be dependent on the facts of substantial reality, but instead, include the nonsubstantial thoughts of God as sufficient ground for justice, and so they are content to locate man’s union with Adam as inside God’s mind alone.

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The Importance of Biblical Realism

a guest post by Ryan Hedrich

(More from Ryan Hedrich may be found at Unapologetica).

Background

In Justification, J. V. Fesko wrote:

In the theology of Aquinas, and those committed to realism, the idea that universals have an existence separate from specific concrete entities, which drew upon the philosophy of Plato (c. 427-.c 348 B.C.) and is also known as the via antiqua (the “old way”), there was a greater emphasis upon seeing justification strictly in ontological terms. With the turn from ontology to discussions on the will of God in the theology of those committed to nominalism, the idea that universals do not have real existence but are merely names applied to qualities found within certain individual objects and that is also known as the via moderna (the “modern way”), for example, in the theology of Biel and William of Ockham (c. 1288 – c. 1348), we see the development of the intellectual framework in which the doctrine of justification could be considered in something other than in terms of ontology. In other words, it seems that nominalism opened the door to a consideration of the forensic nature of justification, and more specifically, the doctrine of imputation. This development, combined with the renaissance of Augustinianism in the fourteenth century, such as in the theology of Thomas Bradwardine (c. 1290 – 1349) and Gregory of Rimini (c. 1300 – 58), contributed to the intellectual development that made the Reformation possible.

McGrath notes six things that one finds in late medieval Augustinian theology that likely contributed to the theology of the Reformation:

A strict epistemological nominalism.

A voluntarist, as opposed to intellectualist, understanding of the ratio meriti (“reckoning of merit”). Voluntarism emphasizes the role of the will contrasted with that of reason or intellect.

The extensive use of the writings of Augustine, particularly his anti-Pelagian works.

A strongly pessimistic view of original sin, with the fall being identified as a watershed in the economy of salvation.

A strong emphasis upon the priority of God in justification, linked to a doctrine of special grace.

A radical doctrine of absolute double predestination.

With these intellectual developments in mind, we can move forward to consider the doctrine of justification in the Reformation and post-Reformation periods. It is against this backdrop that one sees the Reformation begin to give a more precise expression and definition of the doctrine of justification.

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A Realist’s Review of J.V. Fesko’s ‘Death in Adam, Life in Christ,’ Part 2

by Ken Hamrick

Continuing from Part 1

Fesko’s misrepresentations are disturbing. As I read his section on Augustine^[23], I thought maybe he had misunderstood Augustine when Fesko claimed that Realism was about a “biological” union in Adam—that Realism claimed a physical presence of all men in Adam.

However, after Fesko described the views of Shedd and Baird (the Realist School of the 19th century), and showed that he does indeed understand that the view is about the propagation of the soul and the “co-agency” of all men while in Adam^[24], he continues for the remainder of the book to refer to Realism as “biological” and “physical transmission”—not as additional to “spiritual” or “immaterial transmission” (which he ignores) but as if “physical” and “biological” accurately described the Realistic view. Misunderstanding Augustine might be excusable, but continuing the error even after showing a basic understanding of Shedd and Baird is inexcusable! Fesko says,

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A Realist’s Review of J.V. Fesko’s ‘Death in Adam, Life in Christ,’ Part 1

by Ken Hamrick

J. V. Fesko is Academic Dean and Professor of Systematic and Historical Theology at Westminster Seminary in California, and has written many books. I found this book^[1] to be substantive and thought provoking. It is well worth the reading—and I think it demands a response.

Fesko writes in the preface, “[…T]here are few, if any, books that treat both imputed guilt and righteousness. When it came to the history of the doctrine of imputation, there are hardly any monographs that treat the doctrine.” Fesko is a proponent of the modern Reformed view of Covenant (or, Federal) Theology, and defends that view against the main alternatives, historical and contemporary—including the Realistic view. While it is not his main purpose to engage the Realistic view, it is my main purpose in this article to address his engagement of that view, which I have found to be lacking.

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